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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Anderson appeals from his conviction on two counts of aggravated 
assault with a weapons enhancement. He contends the comments of two jurors during 
voir dire regarding his prior incarceration and his ability to present a defense 
unacceptably tainted the jury pool, effectively depriving him of his right to an impartial 
jury. As such, the district court's denial of his motion for a mistrial following the first of 
those comments was in error and should be reversed. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson argued that the comments about his prior 
incarceration could have been taken one of two ways, both of which unacceptably 
tainted the jury, and both of which are properly presented on appeal. The State 
contends that, because Mr. Anderson only argued one of those alternatives below, he 
cannot argue the other now. The State appears to ignore the fact that the district court's 
decision to deny the motion for mistrial was based on the second alternative argument, 
and so both are preserved for appeal. 
The prejudice of the tainted jury from the initial comments is evident, and was 
even recognized by the district court. Furthermore, the fact that a different juror 
subsequently made separate, but no less prejudicial, comments only further evidences 
that the jury pool was unacceptably tainted. Just because the two prejudicial comments 
were unrelated does not, contrary to the State's contentions, save the conviction; 
if the jury that sat was tainted by those comments, and thus, was biased against 
Mr. Anderson, the conviction was in violation of Mr. Anderson's rights. 
1 
Since the district court erroneously denied Mr. Anderson's motion for a mistrial in 
light of the tainted jury pool, this Court should reverse that decision and remand the 
case for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the potential jury pool 
was tainted by comments on Mr. Anderson's incarceration and by comments on his guilt 
and ability to assert his innocence against the State's evidence. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Not Declaring A Mistrial After The Potential Jury Pool Was 
Tainted By Comments On Mr. Anderson's Incarceration And By Comments On His Guilt 
And Ability To Assert His Innocence Against The State's Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Both of Mr. Anderson's arguments regarding the nature of Juror #12's comments 
are properly preserved for, and presented on, appeal. The first, that the comments 
could be taken to mean that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated for prior offenses, was 
preserved by his motion for a mistrial. The second, that the comments could be taken 
to mean that Mr. Anderson either had been, or continued to be, incarcerated in relation 
to this offense, was preserved by the district court's ruling on the motion for a mistrial. 
Regardless of which way the jury panel took those comments, it was tainted by those 
comments, prejudicing Mr. Anderson. 
Additionally, the fact that subsequent comments by Juror #32 were not directly 
related to the comments made by Juror #12 does not mean that Juror #32's comments 
are "irrelevant" to the determination of whether the jury was biased. The Constitution 
protects a right to an impartial jury and, thus, it does not matter if the taint comes from a 
single source or from multiple angles. Either way, the jury is tainted and so a mistrial 
should have been declared. The fact that the district court did not declare such a 
mistrial is thus error and its order should be reversed. 
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B. Juror #12's Comments. Which Informed The Jury Pool That Mr. Anderson Had 
Been Incarcerated "Before" Unduly Prejudiced The Jury Pool, And The District 
Court Erred By Denying Defense Counsel's Motion For A Mistrial 
1. Contrary To The State's Contentions, Mr. Anderson's Arguments About 
Both Alternative Interpretations Of Juror #12's Comments Are Properly 
Before This Court 
Fourteen minutes into the voir dire of the jury panel, Juror #12 told the court 
that "I am an Ada County deputy sheriff. I've been involved in the defendant's 
incarceration .... I've just - he's been in my housing unit before." (Supp. Tr., p.16, 
Ls.15-23.) Defense counsel moved for a mistrial at that time, contending that the jury 
could impermissibly understand that statement to mean that Mr. Anderson had served 
time for prior offenses. 1 (See Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls. 15-21.) The district court denied 
that motion because it said that those comments could have also been taken to mean 
that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated in regard to this offense, and it offered what it 
believed to be a curative instruction in that regard. (See Supp. Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, 
L.11; Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-18.) On appeal, Mr. Anderson pursued his initial challenge, 
as well as a challenge to the adverse ruling entered by the district court. (App. 
Br., pp.8-13.) The State contends that, because the alternative which the district court 
used to justify denying the motion for a mistrial was not a part of Mr. Anderson's motion, 
it could not be pursued for the first time on appeal. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State's 
argument is directly contradicted by Idaho Supreme Court precedent and so should be 
rejected. 
1 The objection was actually made during a sidebar conference and was later repeated 
on the record. (Supp. Tr., p.16, L.15-p.17, L.18; Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.7-9.). 
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The point of requiring a contemporaneous objection is to allow the district court to 
rule on the issue and to prevent the parties from "sandbagging" by not objecting to 
an error in the proceedings in the hope of winning on appeal after seeing the ultimate 
result of the proceedings below. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (2010). 
Mr. Anderson did exactly what the Idaho Supreme Court required of him - he moved for 
a mistrial contemporaneously to Juror #12's comments. (See Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.7-21.) 
He provided the district court with the opportunity to rule on that issue, which it did. 
(See Supp. Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.11.) He did not attempt to "sandbag" by building 
error into the trial; he identified the problem and requested a resolution. That resolution 
was adverse, and so he has the right to challenge that adverse ruling on appeal. 
State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585 (Ct. App. 2008). 
It does not matter, as the State believes (Resp. Br., at p.9), that the defense did 
not argue the alternative understanding of Juror #12's comments - that Mr. Anderson 
remained in custody. It is not a new issue raised on appeal; it is an alternative 
understanding of the issue raised by defense counsel's objection. As such, it is part of 
the same issue preserved by defense counsel's objection. Furthermore, this particular 
alternative understanding of Juror #12's comments was articulated by the district court 
as the basis its decision to overrule the objection. (Supp. Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.10; 
see Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-18 (the district court's comments to the jury on the objection).) 
Since the district court ruled based on that alternative understanding, that analysis is 
preserved for appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) ("This Court has held 
that ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An exception to this 
rule, however, has been applied by this Court when the issue was argued to or decided 
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by the district court .... Since the issue was directly addressed by the trial court below, 
we will decide this issue [on appeal].") (emphasis added); Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 
117 Idaho 351, 356 ( 1990) ("[W]e have allowed an issue that was not formally raised 
below to be considered on appeal when the issue was implicitly before the lower 
tribunal, and was considered and passed on by the tribunal.") (emphasis added); see 
also State, ex rel. Wasden v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 532 (2009) ("[W]here one party 
presents an issue to the trial court, it is addressed by the trial court, and it is raised and 
fully briefed on appeal, the issue may properly be heard by this Court."); 
Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700 (1987) (same); , 
Christensen v. Ransom, 123 Idaho 99, 104 (Ct. App. 1992) (drawing a distinction 
between issues not formally raised below and those never raised below; those issues 
not formally raised, but still ruled on by the district court are preserved for appeal). 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected the State's argument that 
the absence of the specific analysis in the underlying motion prevents a challenge of 
that analysis on appeal. See State v. Griffin, 122 Idaho 733, 738-39 (1992); see a/so 
Northcutt, 117 Idaho at 357. In Griffin, the defendant moved for a sentence reduction 
on several grounds. Id. at 735. The district court discussed those grounds, as well as 
the additional rationale about the defendant's refusal to reveal his drug source for fear 
that doing so would put his life in danger. Id. at 738. The defendant appealed and 
challenged the district court's decisions on all those grounds, including the "fear of his 
life" analysis. Id. at 738-39. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized "that [the defendant] 
did not include in his motions for reduction of sentence the issue of fear for his life if he 
revealed his drug sources. In absence of any other indication that [the defendant] 
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presented this issue to the trial court or that the trial court ruled on the issue, we would 
ordinary not consider the issue on appeal." Id. at 738 (emphasis added). However, the 
Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held that, because the district court had, in fact, 
considered that argument and ruled on that analysis, "we will consider whether the trial 
court failed to demonstrate the reasonableness of [the defendant's] fear for his life if he 
revealed his drug sources." Id. at 739. 
Mr. Anderson, like the defendant in Griffin, brought an issue to the district court's 
attention and argued certain lines of analysis, the district court considered those 
arguments, as well as an additional line of analysis, and entered an adverse ruling. 
Therefore, like the defendant in Griffin, Mr. Anderson is able to pursue an appeal 
challenging the district court's decision along all those lines of analysis. Id. at 739. 
Therefore, both of the alternative interpretations of Juror #12's comments are properly 
before this Court and under either rationale, the jury pool was impermissibly tainted, and 
so the district court erred by not granting the motion for a mistrial. 
2. Regardless Of How The Jurors Understood Juror #12's Comments, Those 
Comments lmpermissibly Tainted The Jury Pool 
Juror #12's comments, if taken as Mr. Anderson argued below - that 
Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated for some prior offense - tainted the jury to the 
point that a mistrial was necessary. See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52-55 
(2008) (vacating a judgment of conviction when propensity evidence was improperly 
introduced); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510-11 (1978) (same, noting that the 
introduction of propensity evidence prejudices the jury). Notably, the State did not offer 
any response in regard to this line of analysis. ( See generally Resp. Br.) Therefore, if 
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the jurors understood Juror #12's comments in this manner, they were prejudiced 
against Mr. Anderson. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52; Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510-11. As a 
result, his constitutional right to an unbiased jury was violated. Such a violation creates 
an unacceptable risk that the verdict was decided on inappropriate factors. See, e.g., 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976). In the alternative, if Juror #12's 
comments were taken as the district court suggested they might be - that Mr. Anderson 
had been or continued to be incarcerated in regard to this offense - Juror #12's 
comments still tainted the jury and prejudiced Mr. Anderson. See, e.g., 
State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 506-07 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 
512) (requiring the defendant to appear at trial in prison garb prejudiced the jury 
because it created "an unacceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming into play). 
The State contends there is no evidence of a "continuing impact" from 
Juror #12's comments. (Resp. Br., p.8.) It is mistaken. The courts have recognized 
that such information does have a continuing impact on the jury's thought processes. 
See, e.g., Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506-07 (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512) (holding that 
information revealed to the jury about a defendant's status as an inmate created "an 
unacceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming into play"). In fact, in this case, 
the district court acknowledged that those comments had a continuing impact: "You 
[the prosecutor] want to educate the rest of the jury by questioning [Juror #12], and 
you're going to find another way to educate them. I don't want to have a mistrial, and 
I'm quite concerned that we might." (Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22 (emphasis added).) 
Additionally, Juror #12's comments were some of the first made by any of the potential 
jurors, only fourteen minutes into the trial proceedings, and were made before any 
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comment by the prosecutor as to the fact that Mr. Anderson had, at any time, been 
arrested in relation to the alleged offense. (See Supp. Tr., p.6, L.10 - p.16, L.23; 
R., p.51.) Therefore, their impact, as the district court indicated, was significant 
because, from the outset, the jurors were aware that Mr. Anderson has served time in 
jail, and knowing that information prejudiced the jurors. See Harrison, 136 Idaho at 
506-07. 
Furthermore, the fact that Juror #12 was not immediately excused for cause 
reinforces the impact his comments had on the jury pool. The State misunderstands 
Mr. Anderson's point about this fact. It believes that the claim is that Juror #12 should 
have been immediately removed. (Resp. Br., p.10 ("[l]t is predicated on a remedy he 
did not request below.").) That is not the case. Even if Juror #12 had been immediately 
removed for cause, there would still be a question about whether his comments 
irrevocably tainted the jury pool. Rather, Mr. Anderson's argument focuses on the 
implicit message that not excusing Juror #12 would have sent to the other jurors: that 
the information Juror #12 knew about Mr. Anderson's criminal history was not overly 
concerning to the district court, and so the other jurors would have viewed their own 
biases as similarly insignificant, and thus, remained silent about those biases during the 
voir dire process. The district court's comments when it decided to ultimately dismiss 
Juror #12 reveal that this sort of message existed in this case. (See Supp. Tr., p.78, 
Ls.10-22.) 
The State also contends that the argument about the implicit message must be 
disregarded as speculative. (Resp. Br., p.10.) First, it is not speculative, given the 
district court's comments in that regard. (See Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22.) Second, 
10 
precedent holds contrary to the State's position. When there is doubt about whether the 
jury was impartial, those doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant (i.e., not 
disregarded, as the State contends). State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 610 (Ct. App. 
2006). Yet that is what the State is asking this Court to do: ignore doubts about 
whether the jury was impartial. Since adopting the State's position and ignoring such 
concerns risks depriving defendants of a fair trial, the Court of Appeals held "that any 
justified doubt that a venireman can 'stand indifferent in a cause' ought to be resolved 
in favor of the accused." Id. (quoting Justus v. Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 87, 90 
(1980)) (emphasis added). As such, the evidence in the record, expressed outright or 
not, does show a continuing impact from Juror #12's comments. 
The State also tries to rely on the curative instruction given by the district court, 
relying on the idea that jurors will follow such instructions. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Regardless 
of the general presumption to that effect, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
curative instructions in cases where there is a risk that the jury pool has been 
impermissibly tainted are not so effective: "a mistrial should ordinary be ordered rather 
than for the court to rely on a cautionary instruction to the jury," and failure to not order 
the mistrial may be error. Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510. Given the district court's concern 
that the jury had, at that point, been irrevocably tainted, it should have ordered the 
mistrial. See id; see also Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506. 
Therefore, since Mr. Anderson has demonstrated that Juror #12's comments 
inappropriately tainted the jury, or at least risked tainting the jury, regardless of how the 
jury understood those comments, the district court's decision to deny the mistrial was 
erroneous. See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. 
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C. The Prejudice Caused By Juror #12's Comments Is Magnified When Considered 
Alongside The Comments By Juror #32 
In addition to hearing Juror #12's prejudicial comments, the jury also heard 
several other prejudicial comments from Juror #32, which compounded the error caused 
by Juror #12's comments and further demonstrated the error in the district court's 
refusal to grant the motion for a mistrial. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). The 
State contends that, because the two statements were not directly related to one 
another, this Court should not consider the impact of Juror #32's statements. (Resp. 
Br., p.13.) This misunderstands the law. "'[T]he question must be whether the event 
which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in 
the context of the full record."' Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 
(2003) (quoting State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983)))). This means that the error is not 
viewed statically, and in this case, it must be viewed in light of the prejudice caused by 
Juror #32's comments. Id. 
After all, the point of voir dire is to ensure that the jury which ultimately hears the 
case is impartial. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988). The defendant has 
the right to an impartial jury. Id.; Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966) 
("[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced 
jurors."); Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011); State v. Ramos, 119 
Idaho 568, 569-70 (1990). Therefore, if the panel is tainted, regardless of how it 
became tainted, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-87; 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11 (where a juror was potentially biased against the 
defendant, the defendant was deprived of his right to an impartial jury). Field is 
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consistent with this precedent. It does not require the single comment by Juror #12 to 
be the basis of the other taints to the jury pool; it requires this Court to examine the 
panel for bias, and if bias is present from the conglomeration of improper comments 
during voir dire, then the district court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial was in 
error and should be reversed. Field, 144 Idaho at 571. The point is that, where the jury 
that sat on the case is biased, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Ross, 487 U.S. at 
86-87. The difference is in how the objection was preserved. Compare Nightengale, 
151 Idaho at 353-54 (preserving the challenge to the jury by moving to strike a biased 
juror for cause, ultimately striking that juror with a peremptory challenge, and exercising 
all remaining peremptory challenges), with Field, 144 Idaho at 571 (preserving the 
challenge to the jury by moving for a mistrial after the information was presented to the 
jury which had been excluded in a motion in limine). If the prejudice caused by Juror 
#12's comments, when added to the prejudice caused by Juror #32's comments, 
reveals that the panel was tainted, then the decision to deny the motion for a mistrial 
based on Juror #12's comments was in error. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89. It does not 
matter, as the State erroneously contends, that the comments did not build off of one 
another. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-15.) It certainly does not mean that Juror #32's 
comments are "irrelevant" to this issue. (See Resp. Br., p.11.) 
In this case, a review of the whole record reveals that Juror #12's comments did 
impermissibly prejudice the jurors who deliberated in Mr. Anderson's case. That is 
because the whole record also contains the troublesome comments made by Juror #32. 
Since Juror #12's comments had at least pushed the case to the brink of a mistrial by 
themselves (see Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22), the added impact of Juror #32's comments 
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reveals that the jury could not have been impartial. This is particularly true since the 
district court did not instruct the jury as to the impropriety of Juror #32's views. Again, 
the State's misunderstanding the point of this argument, mistakenly believes 
Mr. Anderson is claiming some error in regard to the failure to give such an instruction. 
(Resp. Br., pp.13-14.) It is not the fact that no such instruction was given that 
Mr. Anderson is pointing to; it is the implicit message the lack of such an instruction 
would have on the remaining jurors. Even if such an instruction would have been given, 
there would still be a question of whether the jury pool was impermissibly tainted since, 
as the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, the district courts should be wary of 
relying on curative instructions in such cases. See Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510. This Court 
would still have to determine if the prejudice caused by hearing those statements, taking 
into consideration the proposed limiting instruction, still impermissibly biased the jury. 
Ross, 487 U.S. at 86-87; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. In this case, the damage done 
by Juror #32's comments was undiluted by such an instruction, meaning that the impact 
it had on the jurors was more significant. In this same regard, Juror #32 was not 
dismissed for cause. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.6-144.) The district court admitted 
that implicit messages about whether such biases preclude service on the jury are sent 
when a juror was or was not dismissed for cause. (Supp. Tr., p.76, L.11 - p.77, L.8.) 
Therefore, the fact that Juror #32 made those prejudicial comments means that the 
jurors who sat on Mr. Anderson's jury received the message that those perspectives are 
not overly problematic and thus, are not worth mentioning.2 
2 Juror #32 told the panel that it was "unfortunate" that the judicial system allows the 
defendant to challenge the States evidence, to present evidence that events did not 
unfold as the State said, to make arguments that the jury should not believe the State's 
14 
The record is clear that Juror #12's comments had already pushed the panel at 
least to the brink of a mistrial based on bias. (Supp. Tr., p.78, Ls.10-22.) As such, the 
impact of Juror #32's comments, which were independently significant, misstating the 
law and attacking Mr. Anderson's ability to present a defense, definitely pushed the 
panel over the edge, prejudicing them against Mr. Anderson. (See App. Br., pp.13-17.) 
Therefore, an examination of the whole record reveals that the district court erred 
by not ordering a mistrial. See Field, 144 Idaho at 571; Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. 
As a result, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to not declare a 
mistrial based on the fact that the jury pool was tainted, thereby depriving Mr. Anderson 
of his right to an impartial jury. See id.; see also Parker, 385 U.S. at 365-66; Hauser, 
143 Idaho 603, 610-11. 
witnesses, or to offer different interpretations of the evidence (essentially, it is 
"unfortunate" that the defendant is allowed to maintain his innocence against the State's 
evidence). (See Supp. Tr., p.82, L.16 - p.83, L.5; see App. Br., pp.13-14.) In fact, 
Juror #32 basically told the panel that, were the defendant to do so, it would be further 
evidence of guilt, as part of a "victim mentality." (Supp. Tr., p.80 L.17 - p.81, L.8; Supp. 
Tr., p.82, L.16 - p.83, L.5.) That period of voir dire also led to comments regarding use 
of the term "alleged victim" and "victim." (Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15.) The district court's 
statement, that "I do my best to refer to them as alleged victims, because that's what 
they are until the close of evidence," (Tr., p.81, Ls.22-23 (emphasis added)), implied 
that, once the evidentiary period closed, Mr. Anderson would be shown guilty and then 
they could call the complaining witnesses "victims." This indication of Mr. Anderson's 
predetermined guilt added to the tainting of the jury panel. (See App. Br., p.16.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2013. 
/.:.,,,,/ ~::=:=:!.....L..:.~~::.._:==---
BR IAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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MICHAEL PAUL ANDERSON 
INMATE #102291 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE ID 83707 
RICHARD D GREENWOOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
ERIC R ROLFSEN 
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
BRD/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
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